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THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF YUGOSLAVIA UNDER THE WORKERS' SELF-
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND RAPID GROWTH
I. INTRODUCTION
A common hrase in development economics is "each less develofjed
country is unique." A qualifier that might be added to this
expression is "but some are more unique than others." Yugoslavia
certainly qualified as being among the "more unique than others."
The uncommon characteristics of the country are, bxwever, more
in the nature of being man-made rather than acts of God, for
example, workers' self-management, decentralized socialism and
frequent institutional changes - sometimes drastic - combined with
rapid economic growth. Consequently the Yugoslavian industriali-
zation experience, the willingness to experiment, the successes
and setbacks, has much to contribute to the field of development
economics. Yugoslavia's particular approach to industrialization
and economic development is what this study is all about.
This paper is part of a project dealing with "Import Substitution
and Export Diversification in the Industrialization Process of
Selected Developing Countries" being undertaken at the Kiel
Institute of World Economics, with financial support provided
by the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft". The paper represents
the result of research undertaken in Kiel as of April 1974.
It was then the author's intention to extend this paper by
providing additional evidence which can only be obtained in
Yugoslavia itself. However, extensive efforts to obtain the
necessary approval of Yugoslav officials for such a research trip
have so far proved extremely frustrating and fruitless (the
correspondence that has taken place in the nine months since
planning for a field trip to Yugoslavia was begun is almost equal
in size to this paper). The author wishes to thank his colleagues
at the Institute for their advice and encouragement.- 2 -
The main concerns of this paper are certain selected aspects of
Yugoslav industrialization since 1952. To provide some familiarity
with industrial progress prior to 1952, the paper begins, after a
brief introduction, with a short historical survey of the Yugoslav
economy. This survey is divided into two parts, the first dealing
with the inter-war period and the second with the period of central
planning which followed the second World War and preceded the intro-
duction of the workers' self-management system. Next follows a review
of institutional and policy developments since the introduction of
the workers' self-management system. This section is also divided
into two parts. The first part is concerned with institutional and
policy aspects of what has been termed the inaugural stage of develop-
ment under the system of workers' self-management, that is, the years
from 1952 to 1961; a brief description of the system is contained
in this segment. The latter part deals with the more recent period,
extending from 1961, which we have termed the reform stage. Following
this generally descriptive material is an empirical examination of
Yugoslav industrialization since 1952. This section begins with an
overview of Yugoslav industrialization since 1952. Then the actual
level and structure of industrial production is compared with hypo-
thetical figures based on the past performance of other countries.
Next the roles of import substitution and export expansion in the
industrial growth process are examined. After this the interrelated-
ness of the economy is investigated. The linkages associated with
the various economic sectors were computed and analyzed in the light
of certain other industrialization variables. In the next sector the
structure of Yugoslavia's foreign trade is assessed in terms of its
capital and labor content and its directional pattern. The regional
distribution of Yugoslavia's expanding national income is the subject
of the next part of the paper. Following this an examination is made- 3 -
of the size structure of industrial enterprises, and changes in
this structure over time; efficiency implications of the size
structure are noted. Some concluding remarks bring the study to a
close.- 4 -
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. The Inter-War Period
The state of Yugoslavia officially came into being in 1918.
It had a population of 12.1 million in 1921, which had grown to
2 15.6 million in 1939. The growth in production that took place
prior to World War II was slow-paced, as the data in the following
table indicate. The growth of GNP at 2.6 percent per annum together
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Sources: Rows 1-3: Anton Vratusa, "Jugoslavia, 1971", Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1971, p. 149; Rows 4-5: Vladimir
Pertot, Ekonomika Medunarodne Razmjene Jugoslavije, Knjiga II,
(Zagreb: Informator, 1970), pp. 10-11; Row 6Y Statisticki
Godisnjak, FNRJ, (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1958), p. 75.
1925 = 100 in the case of exports and imports.
Prior to 1929 it was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes.














with the population growth rate of 1.5 percent imply that per
capita product increased at about 1.1 percent per annum during the
period. Economic policies of the government included some assistance
to agriculture. A land reform program was begun in 1919; agri-
cultural exports were promoted via trade agreements in the 1930s.
Industrial policy existed in the form of state enterprise (in iron
and steel, salt, tobacco, oil refining and mining, among others),
one of the most protective tariff systems in Europe, and incentives
for foreign investment in the economy.
The sectoral composition of the national income between 1923 and
1938 underwent moderate change (Table 2) . As to be expected after
Table 2






Sourcess 1923s George W. Hoffmann and Fred Warner Meal,
Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1962), p. 300; 1938s Privreda FNRJ u
1952 Godini (Belgrad: Ekonomiski Institut FNRJ, 1953),
p. 170.
This section on the economics of pre-war Yugoslavia is meant to
be only a brief survey. For more on the inter-war Yugoslav
economy, see Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Yugoslavia (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949); Robert
F. Byrnes (ed.), Yugoslavia (New York, Praeger, 1957; and Joseph
T. Bombelles, Economic Development of Communist Yugoslavia
(Stanford: Hoover Foundation, 1968).- 6 -
observing the data in Table 1, the share of the industrial sector in
national income edged upward at a slow pace - at a rate of about
one-fourth of one percent per year. However, the share of industry in
Yugoslav national income in 1938 compares favorably with that of
other countries at the time. Table 3 contains data on the industrial
2
and agricultural shares of 11 other countries. As can be seen,
the Yugoslav manufacturing and mining share exceeded the twelve-
country average and was about 39 percent greater than the average of
the 5 currently less developed countries in the table. The Yugoslav
agricultural sector was the largest of this group of countries. The
non-industrial, non-agricultural sectors taken as a group were therefore
relatively underdeveloped. Since the industrial and agricultural
shares did not undergo pronounced change during the inter-war period,
it would appear that these sectors were relatively large upon the
inception of the state.
The share of the labor force employed in agriculture and forestry
was slightly higher and the share in industry slightly lower in 1938 than
in 1931 (Table A). The increase in the share of the labor force
employed in these sectors would appear to indicate some lack of
employment opportunities in other sectors of the economy. This is
further borne out by the decrease in the employment shares of
handicrafts, and commerce and tourism, in addition to industry, and
the constant share of transport. The relative increase in employment in
administration, social services and others, that is, in the
Unless specified otherwise, references to the Yugoslav industrial
sector will be taken to mean manufacturing, mining and energy
production.
2No claims are made as to this being a representative sample. Its
composition was influenced by date availability and a desire for
diversified coverage.- 7 -
bureaucratic area, is obviously without great significance. Total
industrial employment approximately doubled during the period between
the wars, reaching a level of about 300,000 in 1933. Meanwhile
population was increasing by about 3.5 million. Assuming a labor
force participation rate of this population increment of 50 percent,
this means the labor force increased by about 1.75 million, of which on-
ly approximately 8 percent were absorbed by the industrial sector.
Yugoslav exports prior to World War II consisted predominately of
raw materials and semi-processed goods. The leading export was
timber, which accounted for about 15 percent of total exports.
Major import items included iron and steel products, raw cotton
2
and cotton yarn and products. The structure of exports and imports
in 1939 by use of product and stage of production is presented in
Table 5. The foreign trade structure at this time was not untypical
for a country at such a stage of development. Exports consisted
primarily of industrial materials; exports of capital goods and
finished manufactures were,not surprisingly, a minor share of total
exports. On the other hand, over 50 percent of imports consisted
of finished goods; similarly capital and consumer goods represented
over one-half of imports. As can also be seen in Table 5, the
structure of Yugoslavia's foreign trade was vastly transformed during
the post-war period of industrialization. In addition to structural
changes, the balance of trade was to move from a characteristic
The share of the service sector in national income was falling
however (see Table 2).
2
A more detailed breakdown of the inter-war foreign trade structure is
contained in Joza Tomasevich, "Foreign Economic Relations,
1918-1941", in Kerner, op. cit.- 8 -
TABLE 3
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA AND
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Source: Sectoral origin from U.N. , Statistical Yearbook 1956 (N.Y.: United
Nations, 1956) pp. 473-76; GDP per capita from Maizels, Alfred,
Growth and Trade, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970,
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Source: F.E. Ian Hamilton, Yugoslavia, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1968, p. 118.- 10 ~
surplus, in every year from 1931 to 1939 the trade balance was
positive, to persistent deficit.
On the eve of World War II Yugoslavia was a poor country. About
three-fourths of the population was agricultural. Exports in the main
consisted of primary products and industrial raw materials. The
industrial sector accounted for about one-quarter of the national
income. Slovenia, Vojvodina, Croatia and Serbia (mainly because of
Belgrade) were at higher stages of industrialization than the other
republics and autonomous areas (see Table 6). The Yugoslav per
capita income of 175 United States dollars of 1955 is the lowest of
the small, geographically wide-ranging sample of countries in
Table 3.
2. Central Planning
The Yugoslav economic plant was severely damaged during World War II.
Close to AO percent of the manufacturing industry was destroyed or
badly damaged. Human loss was also great; about 11 percent of the
population was killed during the war, not all of whom met death
at the hands of foreigners. Twenty five percent of the population
was left without shelter, 50 percent of the livestock and agri-
cultural equipment was destroyed as well as the same share of the
2 railways and rollingstock.
Branko Horvat, "Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period:
Problems, Ideas, Institutional Developments", American Economic
Review, Vol. LXI, No. 3, Part 2, June 197 1, p. 71.
2
Joel B. Dirlam and James L. Plummer, An Introduction to the Yugoslav
Economy, Merrill Publishing Co., Columbus, Ohio, 1973, p. 15.-11-
Table 5
STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY STAGE OF PRODUCTION AND USE OF PRODUCTS
1939, 1972
(Percentages)
1 . Use of Products
Reproduction Goods(industrial materials)
Investment Goods (capital goods)
Consumer Goods
2. Stage of Production
Crude Articles (raw materials)
Simply Transformed Articles (i.e.,
semi-finished goods)































Source: Jugoslavia 1945-1964 (Belgrad: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1965),
p. 207, and Statisti£ki GodisVjak 1973, p. 219. More specific
definitions of the above product categories are not provided.- 12 -
Table 6











































Source: Hamilton, op.cit., p. 132.- 13 -
The coining to power of the Communist Party under Josip Broz Tito
meant the end of capitalism in Yugoslavia. Most of the non-agricultural
sector of the economy was nationalized in 1946. The Federal Planning
Commission was established in May of that year. The economic policy
of central planning, administrative socialism, or etatism, as it has
variously been called, x^as born. It was to succumb by 1952. The
Yugoslavs copied the Soviet economic system more closely than any
other Eastern European nation. Economic policy was oriented to-
wards development via industrialization. Within the industrial
sector, heavy industry was the key branch; self-sufficiency in
capital goods was a high priority goal.
The First Five Year Plan appeared in the spring of 1947 and covered
the period of 1947-1951. In addition to the Five Year Plan, there were
annual, quarterly and ten-day plans. The plan set very high goals
for the economy. National income was to increase by a factor of
1.9, agricultural output by 1.5, and industrial output by 4.9
(all compared to the levels of 1939). Foreign trade came under
complete control of the state. Imports were viewed as a necessity
for the fulfilment of the plan; exports were a means of disposing
surplus production. Certain events occurred that helped to prevent
2 the goals of the plan from being realized. These included an
The weight of the annual plan, 3,300 pounds, provides an idea of the
degree of planning.
2
The index of agricultural production (1930-1939 average = 100) stood
at 89 in 1947 and 75 in 1952 (Yugoslav Survey, Vol. XI, No. 4, November
1970, p. 4). The index of industrial production (1939 = 100) was at a
level of 121 in 1947 and 166 in 1952 (Industrija 1971, Savezni
Zavod za Statistiku, Belgrad, 1972, p. 11).14 -
economic blockade by the Cominform countries, drought, and
collectivization efforts in agriculture. Disillusionment with
administrative socialism developed^ the system of central planning
broke down.~" 1 ^ —
III. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY MATTERS
'' The Inaugural Stage
The end of the Soviet-type economic system in Yugoslavia had
its beginnings in 1950. In that year the Law on Management of
Government Business Enterprises and Economic Associations by
Workers
1 Collectives was enacted. The passage of this law
marked the beginning of the self-management system. Detailed
central planning, in which individual enterprises received
output quotas, was replaced by a system- of planning by basic
proportions. Enterprises had to follow certain rules, such as
minimum capacity utilization, but they no longer had specific
output quotas to meet. The federal economic plan determined
certain basic proportions, such as consumption, the rate of
accumulation and the distribution of investment. The evolution
since 1950 of Yugoslavia's particular brand of socialistic
system has been, and remains, a virtually continuous process.
The 1952-1961 period we have termed the inaugural stage of
2
development (under the workers' self-management system).
During the first part of the period industry in general and
heavy industry in particular continued to be stressed, as in
the previous stage. In 1956 this emphasis on the development
of heavy industry softened considerably, as reflected in the
structure of industrial investment (Table A-l).
2Any demarkation of Yugoslav economic development into distinct
stages must of necessity be less than exact. The changes do not
tend to be abrupt and well-tdefined. The movement from one stage to
another involves writing laws, debating them in the Parliament,
and making the necessary institutional changes. There thus may
be a period extending to a few years during which one stage is
terminating and the next is completely operational.- 16 -
The adoption of the system of workers' self-management was a
reaction to a feeling that administrative socialism, while
freeing workers from exploitation by capitalists resulted in the
substitution of state bureaucrats for capitalists as the exploiters
of the workers. Now management of the firm was to be taken out of
the hands of the state, operating through its official government
representative, and put into the hands of the workers themselves
(state ownership was replaced with "social ownership").
Management organs of the firm consist of the workers' council,
the management board and the director.
All the employees of the enterprise, termed the workers' collective*
elect the workers* council by secret ballot. Council members must
be members of the collective and receive no extra payment for
their service on the council. The members of the council, from
15 to 120, depending on the size of the enterprise, are elected for
2 a two-year period. The council performs a policy-making function
Private activities, consisting mainly of construction, personal
services, restaurants, motor transport and agriculture, are exempt
from the rule of self-management. The self-management system is a
major topic in itselfj an admittedly brief description is presented
here to provide the reader with some familiarity with the insti-
tutional nature of the system. A discussion of the theory of the
worker-managed enterprise is beyond the scope of this paper (the
goals of the enterprise seem to be as varied and subject to as
many interpretations as those of the capitalist firm).
2
Half of the members are elected annually. Enterprises are free
to fix the tenure and size of the council in their by-laws. In
practice the two-year term of office and size range of 15-120
members have been adopted by most enterprises. In enterprises of up to 30
employees, the workers' council consists of all. the workers. In
addition to business enterprises, self-management has been ex-
tended to all organizations and institutions in the field of
public services, research, education, culture etc.- 17 -
and meets once every 1-2 months on the average. A managing
board is elected by the council (unless the enterprise has fewer
than 10 employees); this board usually consists of 5 to 11 members,
including the director of the enterprise, who is an ex officio
member. Recently the existence of a board of management was left
to the discretion of the enterprise. The board acts like an
executive arm of the council; it is responsible for establishing
basic production targets, preparing financial reports and various
proposals for the council, executing council decisions, and for
general supervision of the director of the enterprise. In the larger
enterprises self-management has been decentralized so that, in
addition to the workers' council and management board of the entire
enterprise, separate self-management bodies exist at, for example,
the plant or process levels (work units). Decisions such as those
regarding income distribution, hiring and firing, job assignments,
and working conditions may be made at t u work unit level of self-
management. Joint decision-making among two or more work unit
councils may occur. The enterprise by-laws specify those decision-
making powers that are vested in the enterprise workers' council
and those belonging to the work unit councils.
Among its duties are approving and suggesting changes in the
development plans of the enterprise, electing and dismissing members
of the managing board, dealing with matters of discipline and wor-
king conditions, setting wage rates for each job classification,
determining the allocation of net earnings between personal
incomes and reinvestment, approving participation in joint ventures
and mergers, and adopting the by-laws of the enterprise.- 18 -
The enterprise director is responsible for day-to-day operations
of the enterprise. His functions are specified in the by-laws of each
enterprise. He carries out decisions of the workers"s council and
the board of management and in general coordinates the operations
of the enterprise. The director is appointed by the workers'
council after all applicants have been considered on the basis of
public competition. The term of office is four years, with re-
election and early dismissal possible. In 1972, 6130 enterprises
elected workers' councils consisting of 135,171 members, of whom
16.8 percent were women9 11.5 percent were young people (under
27 years of age), and 53.7 percent were production workers.
The abandonment of administrative socialism carried with it an end
to the state foreign trade monopoly. The nation made its first
gesture toward free trade, which turned out to be exceedingly
elusive and difficult to achieve, in 1952. The exchange rate, which
previously was without economic meaning, was changed from 50 to
300 dinars per U.S. dollar. At the same time a system of export
and import coefficients was introduced. These coefficients were
multiplied by the official exchange rate (and later by the
settlement rate) to determine the receipts and payments in dinars
of exporters and importers. The export coefficients in 1952 ranged
Jugoslav Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 4, November 1973, pp. 14 and 23. A
new enterprise may be founded by a governmental agency, an existing
enterprise or group of enterprises, or by a group of private
citizens. Once the initial financing and appointment of a director
are carried out by the founder, the firm is turned over to the
work collective for operation. When the number of paid non-family
employees of a firm exceeds 5, the firm's operation must be turned
over to the work collective, i.e., the firm becomes socially owned.- 19 -
from 0.8 to 6 and import coefficients from 0.8 to 10. Thus
the rate of exchange for different commodities ranged from 240
to 3000 dinars per U.S. dollar in 1952. Low coefficients were
applied to imports of machinery and raw materials and to raw
material exports. Imports of consumer goods and exports of finished
products were placed in the high coefficient category. The system
of multiple exchange rates remained in force, with revisions, until
1961. A summary of Yugoslav exchange rates from 1952-1972 is
contained in Table 7. In 1954 a special settlement rate of exchange
was introduced at 632 dinars per dollar. A free foreign exchange
market was established in 1951 where exporters could sell foreign
exchange that was part of their retention quota (20-45 percent in
1952). By 1956 the retention quota had been reduced to 1 percent
and the free market was taken over by the National Bank. It was
discontinued altogether as of 1960.
2. The Reform Stage
The period beginning with 1961 and extending to the present we
have called the reform stage of development. It includes the major
economic reforms of 1961 and 1965. These reforms came on the
heels of a very successful completion of the Five Year Plan of
1957-1961. The plan was declared fulfilled after four years. On the
domestic scene, the 1961 reforms were directed mainly towards the
banking and financial, and the income distribution systems. The
proportion of the earnings of enterprises put at their own
disposal was increased. Flat rate taxes replaced progressive
The proportion of the social product, that is, value added, of the
enterprises at their own disposal (i.e., net personal income, enter-
prise funds and depreciation) was 42.8 percent in 1959 and 50
percent in 1961. (Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 11, No. 3, August 1970,
p. 82).- 20
taxes on enterprise income. The banking system was decentralized.
Short-term lending was transferred from the National Bank to
communal banks, republic banks were set up and political control
of banking operations was relaxed. The 1961 reforms were in the
main aimed at expanding the role of the market and increasing the
country's international competitiveness.
Foreign-trade-system-related reforms in 1961 included a devaluation
of the dinar and discontinuance of the multiple exchange rate
system, which had existed since 1952. The official exchange rate
had been 300 dinars per U.S. dollar. However this rate was vir-
tually imperative once the special settlement rate of 632 dinars
per dollar was introduced in late 1954. The new uniform rate
became 750 dinars per dollar in 1961. The system of export and
import coefficients was replaced by an import tariff and export
subsidy arrangement. Export was in the main free although certain
goods, consisting mainly of agricultural goods and industrial raw
materials, were subject to quota or permit. Export proceeds were
to be surrendered to the National Bank; part of the proceeds, for
example 7 percent for most industrial exports, could be repurchased
by the enterprises. About 20 percent of imports were liberalized,
others were subject to permit or quota.
The first two years into the sixties were problem years for the
Yugoslav economy. Inflation, relatively slow growth and an aggra-
vating balance of payments deficit were the major sore spots.
The Five Year Plan of 1961-1965 was abandoned. A vigorous debate
ensued between supporters of further decentralization and reliance
on the market and advocates of a shift toward more centralization.- 21 -
TABLE 7

















































































































As of Dec. 28, 1951 when it was changed from Din 50 per US dollar. The official rate had virtually no
operational significance in the 1955-1964 period. - ^As of July 26, 1965. On Jan. 1, 1966 a new dinar
equal to 100 old dinarswas introduced. - This rate became effective on Jan. 22, 1971. - Became
effective on Dec. 21, 1971. - These are the rates applicable to sales of foreign exchange by exporting
enterprises. They are derived by applying various coefficients to the settlement rate of exchange (to the
official rate prior to 1954). The coefficient varied with respect to commodities. Between 1952 and 1960
the coefficient ranged between 0.5 and 6 and the number of coefficients ranged from 12 to 35 at any
one time. - These are the rates applicable to purchases of foreign exchange by Yugoslav importing
enterprises. They are derived in the same way as the export rates. Between 1952 and 1960 import
coefficients ranged between 0.5 and 10.0. Lower coefficients were applied to foreign exchange purchased
to import "essential" goods with higher coefficients for "less essentials" and luxuries. The system
of export and import coefficients was replaced by an import tariff and export subsidy system in 1961.
Applicable to receipts from emigrants' remittances and certain other non-commercial items. Discontinued
after 1961. - Tlnd of year rates. As of 1956 the free market was taken over by the National Bank where
it sold exchange for a few imports and invisibles (less than 1 percent of total sales of foreign
exchange). Previously exporters could sell exchange that was part of their retention quota in the free
market. Terminated after 1959. - Extremes of end of month rates on U.S. banknotes and/or unlicensed
transfers to New York. - The rate applicable to most commercial transactions (after being
multiplied by the appropriate export or import coefficient) from December 1954 to July 1965 (became
unified settlement rate as of Jan. 15, 1961). - ''Rate for foreign tourists and diplomats in Yugoslavia.
Discontinued after 1961.
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, Washington, various issues; Pick's Currency Yearbook, Pick
Publishing Corp., New York, various issues.- 22
The views of the former prevailed. The decision to move toward greater
decentralization and reliance on the market was made official when
the federal parliament,in 1965, put its approval on the next
reform. The reform had both short-term and long-term objectives.
Short-run goals included an easing of inflation, moving the
balance of payments toward equilibrium, reducing unemployment and
increasing industrial capacity utilization. Longer-term objectives
were concerned with increasing economic efficiency via the market.
The price system was to be reformed, growth and investment policies
revised, foreign trade liberalized and international competitive-
ness increased.
The economic reform of 1965 was somewhat similar to that of 1961,
although in 1965 there was to be stronger drive towards decentra-
lization and becoming more internationally competitive. Following
the advance in this direction that took place as a result of the
reforms of 1961, some amount of retreat occurred prior to 1965.
Import restrictions increased, customs duties rose, price controls
were expanded, and wage guidelines became mandatory rather than
2
voluntary. The dinar was again devalued (this time the meaningless
Rudolph Bicanic, "Economics of Socialism in Yugoslavia: The Third
Stage - the Reform", in R. Bicanic, Turning Points in Economic
Development, Moutton, The Hague, 1972, p. 233. Appears also in
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1966, pp. 633-652, under
the title, "Economics of Socialism in a Developed Country."
%ielen Milenkovitch, Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought,
New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971, p. 171.'- 23 -
official rate of 300 dinars per dollar was abandoned) and tariffs and
import controls reduced. The price system was to be restructured
so as to bring prices more in line with world prices and to
correct distortions in relative prices (see p. 25 and Appendix
Table 2). The prices of industrial goods had been kept high in
relation to raw material prices as a device to stimulate industrial
production. Since the new price policy was likely to stimulate infla-
tion, price controls were extended to 90 percent of the products.
Additional steps were taken in 1965 to increase the share of enter-
prises in their product. This share, defined as the sum of net
personal incomes, depreciation and enterprise funds, increased from
54 percent in 1964 to 59 percent in 1965. The 1965 reform shifted
the source of investment funds to the banks and enterprises and away
2 from the government. Direct taxes on enterprises were eliminated
and the incidence of the turnover tax was shifted from wholesale to
3
retail enterprises. Not all of the reforms became operational
immediately, e.g., much of the reform of the foreign trade system
did not become operative until 1967. In that same year export credit
was expanded and made more flexible. The average tariff rate increased
O.E.C.D., Economic Survey of Yugoslavia, Paris, August 1966, p. 8.
Price controls were subsequently relaxed. The proportion of in-
dustrial products covered by price controls was 48 percent in 1968
(Economic Survey of Yugoslavia, 1970, p. 14).
2
Enterprises and banks accounted for 43.6 percent of investment funds
in 1963, 63.5 percent in 1964, 73.3 percent in 1965 and 87 percent
in 1966 (Statisticki Godisnjak, 1967, p. 254.)
J.T. Crawford, "Yugoslavia's New Economic Strategy: A Progress Report",
in Economic Developments in Eastern Europe, U.S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committees U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1970, p. 612.- 24 -
from 18.8 percent in 1962 to 23.3 percent in 1964 (Table 8). The
average rate has fallen somewhat since 1968 to about 11 percent.
Yugoslav tariff rates in general do not appear high in comparison
to rates in other less developed countries. In 1968 a 3 percent
customs surcharge and a 1 percent customs clearing tax were
imposed on all commodities other than those exempt from import
duty. In July 1970 an additional 5 percent import surcharge was
imposed on all goods which were subject to a customs duty.
Restrictions on foreign exchange earnings were loosened somewhat.
An import deposit scheme with an initial rate of 50 percent was
put into effect in October 1970. The rate was gradually lowered
and the scheme was abandoned in January 1971. The 5 percent import
surcharge of 1970 was reduced to 2 percent in January 1971, increased
to 6 percent in July 1971, and discontinued in December 1972.
Other policy measures of July 1971 included a 6 percent subsidy on
exports to convertible currency areas and Poland, a reduction in
foreign exchange quotas, and special restrictions on the import
of private autos and light commercial vehicles. The dinar was
devalued to 15 new dinars per dollar in January 1971 and to 17
2 in December. Restrictions on the importation of certain consumer
Export promotion appears to have declined following the reform
of 1965, which eliminated export subsidies.
2
A floating exchange rate system was adopted on July 12, 1973.
External convertibility of the dinar was established in January
1972 and a limited foreign exchange market opened in May 1973.
In a currency reform, 100 old dinars were made equal to 1 new
dinar on January 1, 1966.- 2> -
TABLE 8
















Source: Yugoslav Survey, Vol. IV, No. 14, 1963, pp. 2046-2047; Vol. XI,
No. 1, 1970, p. 57.- 26 -
durables were tightened in December 1971. Measures were also taken
in 1971 to stimulate joint ventures, which became legal in 1967,
2
and to restrict borrowing abroad. The foreign exchange retention
quota on January 1, 1972 was raised from 7 to 20 percent for all
enterprises, except for tourist organizations (45 percent) and
engineering work abroad (100 percent).
Since the creation in 1955 of the Federal Price Office, a system
of administratively controlled prices has evolved. Certain goods
have been subject to fixed prices, others to ceiling prices,
control on the basis of advance approval, and minimum prices. Price
3
freezes have also been applied, for example, in 1965 and 1971.
The price reforms of 1961 and 1965 were both aimed at diminishing
distortions in the price system by increasing agricultural and
raw material prices relative to the prices of manufactured goods.
Producers' prices of industrial goods rose by 6 percent in 1961.,
agricultural goods by 15 percent and retail prices by 8 percent
(Appendix Table 2). In 1965 industrial producers' prices increased
by 15 percent, agricultural producers' prices by 43 percent and
retail prices by 29 percent; the rate of inflation as shown by the
implicit social product deflator was 28.4 percent. The ratio of the
index of prices of manufactured goods to that of agricultural goods
reveals that the terms of trade for agricultural goods have been
increasing during the entire 1952-1972 period. After a period of gradual
improvement, the rate of increase picked up during the first half of
the 1960s, reflecting the price reforms previously noted. The
improvement seems to be continuing in the 1970s.
OECD, Economic Survey of Yugoslavia, 1972, p. 53.
2Ibid.
3
Horvat, op. cit., p. 110.- 27 -
IV. EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER THE SYSTEM OF
WORKERS * SELF-MANAGEMENT
*• An Overview
Economic growth since the New Economic System was launched
in 1952 has been both rapid and unstable. The growth of industry
from 1955 to 1970 of close to 10 percent annually exceeds that
of the various country groups found in Table 9. The growth,
of total and per capita social product also holds up well in
an international comparison. Concealed within the growth rates
contained in Tables 9 and 10 is a considerable degree of in-
stability. For example, industrial production grew at a rate of
The 1960-1970 rate calculated by the author from official Yugos-
lav data on net material product in 1966 prices is 6.5 percent.
Social product (SP) differs from GNP in that "non-productive"
activities are excluded from the former. Included in the non-
productive, or non-economic category are health, social security,
culture, education, science, economic chambers, banking, in-
surance, government bodies and administrative agencies, and
social organizations (Yugoslav Survey, Vol. XII, Wo. 2, May
1971, p. 37 fn.) GNP exceeds SP by an amount that has variously
been estimated to range from 10 to 25 percent. OECD estimates
of Yugoslavian GNP in recent years have exceeded official
Yugoslav statistics of SP by approximately 15 percent. Note that
not all services are put in the non-productive category. Ser-
vices connected with the production of material goods, for
example, trade and transport, are included as productive
activities.- 28 -
16 percent in 1963 and 1964, while in 1967 there was no growth at all.
The social product expressed in 1966 prices expanded by 24 percent
in 1957, 2 percent in i958, 18 percent in 1959, 4 percent in 1962,








inflation has also varied widely (see the Appendix). The Yugoslav
experience can thus be seen to have consisted of rapid growth which
was accompanied by considerable short-run price and growth
instability.
The period of workers' self-management can be described as being
a time during which the nation moved towards greater decentralization
(politically and economically) as well as towards a more open economy.
The movement throughout the period has in general been forward,
although at times there have been temporary retreats. The republics,
communes and enterprises have all experienced an expansion of their
decision-making capacities. The industrial export share of the
social product almost tripled during the 20 years to 1972 (from
4.6 to 13.2 percent at current prices and exchange rates). The
industrial import share has risen also, although not as steadily
as the export share. These developments, together with the approxi-
mately 15 percent greater growth rate of industrial exports than
of industrial production, point towards the conclusion that Yugos-
lav industrial growth and institutional change have not taken place
Unless otherwise indicated, data in Part IV are from
Statisticki Godisnjak, SFRJ.- 25 -
Table 9
AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPOUND GROWTH RATES OF REAL GROSS DOMESTIC












































Calculated by the author from data in Statisticki Godisnjak SFRY 1972.
Source; U.N. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1972, New York,
1972, Tables 6.2 and 6.7.- 30 -
TABLE 10
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1. Average Annual Compound Growth Rates
Population
Social Product
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at the exchange rate of
15 ND "$ 1 and in 1966 prices)




















Broad definition of industrial exports, e.g., includes food
throughout this table. Exports of SITC 5-8 rose from 37.9


















percent of total exports in
In current prices. Exchange conversion rates used: 1952 and 1956: 300
1961: 750 (old) dinars - $ 1; 1965: 12.5 (new) dinars - $ 1; 1970: 15























Sources: Computed from data in Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku
Statisticki Godisnjak, SFRJ; Statistika Spoljne Trgovine SFRJ; Industrijska Preduzeca;
Industrisa.31 -
behind closed doors.
The more rapid growth of industrial value added than of the social
product implies an increase in the share of the industrial sector
in the social product. This is of course what has actually happened,
as Table 11 reveals. A contributor to the rapid economic growth was
a high investment rate. The share of gross fixed capital formation
Table 11































































There are of course other indicators of the openness of the country
besides the foreign trade ones cited here.- 32
in the social product (1966 prices) averaged 31 percent in
1952-1970. Structural changes in the foreign trade sector are
highlighted by the increase in the share of industrial exports
(broad definition) in total exports (from 56 to 85 percent).
We have attempted in this section to provide a skeletal review of
the industrialization of Yugoslavia since the system of workers'
self-management became a reality. The growth performance has been



















Incremental capital-output ratios (IGOR) for various periods were








Source: Investicije, 1947-19699 Institut 2a Ekonomiku Investi-
cija (Institute for Economic Investment), Belgrade,
1971; Statisticki Godisnjak SFRJ.
The increase in the ICOR for industry likely reflects an increasing
share of industrial investment going to the relatively capital-
intensive industries. Eight of the most capital-intensive industries
(electrical power, paper, coal, wood, ferrous metals, non-ferrous
metals, petroleum and non-metals) accounted for 56 percent of
industrial investment in 1961-1965 and 63 percent in 1965-1970.
There are of course other factors that may have contributed to the
change in the ICOR. An analysis of these factors lies outside the
scope of this paper.- 33 -
Among these problems are inflation (the inflation rate was 19
percent in 1971 and 15 percent in 1972), slackening of the growth
rate, regional income disparities (per capita social product in
the autonomous province of Kosvovo was about one-fifth that of
Slovenia in 1970), and balance of payments disequilibrium (the
current account balance in millions of U.S. dollars in 1970, 1971
and 1972 was -340, -324, and 294 respectively; exports as a
percentage of imports in the same years were 58.4, 55.8 and 69.1
percent).
2. The Level and Structure of Industrial Production - Actual
versus Estimated Hypothetical
Yugoslavia's experience with central planning of the Soviet-type
contributes to an intuitive feeling that the industrial sector
of the economy has grown faster, in relation to the rest of the
economy, than "average". In this section this hypothesis will be
empirically examined. To do this the actual share of industr}
7 in
the economy's output will be compared with an estimated
hypothetical share der5.ved from a cross-sectional (over 40 countries)
regression equation in which GNP was regressed on population and
per capita income. The actual and hypothetical shares have been
The hypothetical shares were computed from equations contained in a
cross-section regression model in G. Fels, K.W. Schatz and F.
Wolter, "Der Zusammenhang zwischen Produktionsstruktur und Ent-
wicklungsniveau, Versuch einer Strukturprognose 'fur die westdeutsche
Wirtschaft", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd., CVI, 1971, I,
pp. 240-278. Yugoslav social product was increased by 15 percent
in an attempt to frame the analysis on a GNP basis. The Yugoslav
definition of industry encompasses manufacturing, mining and power.
To put the shares on a comparable basis, the normal share includes
manufacturing and mining.~ 34 -
calculated for three post-war years. It can be seen that the
economy was "over-oriented" towards industry (in relation to the
countries included in the study cited below). The ratio of the
actual to hypothetical hare however has declined in the later
years, indicating that the growth of the Yugoslav industrial
sector relative to the growth
1952 196! 1970
(percentages)
Actual 19.1 25.8 31.7
Estimated Hypothetical. 13.2 19.0 24.3
of other economic sectors has been slower than expected based on
the experience of other countries. An explanation of this ten-
dency may be that the relatively high actual share m 1952
reflects the imitative strategy of the central planning period,
while in more recent years the influence of this legacy has
declined. Nevertheless, the actual share in 1970 exceeded the
hypothetical by 30 percent. The data point toward the conclusion
that the industrial sector in the post-war period in Yugoslavia
has been larger than would be expected from the experiences of
other countries; the trend since decentralization began has
been toward a gradual reduction of the ra-tio of the actual to the
hypothetical share, while the industrial share of total output
remains considerably larger than one would expect based on the
past performance of other countries.- 35 -
In order to determine the relative effect of Yugoslavia's
industrialization policies, the hypothetical structure of the
industrial sector itself has also been calculated and compared
with the actual structure (see the article cited in the previous
footnote for the regression equations used and the list of over
70 countries used in their estimation). The structure was
estimated using value added data for 1952, 1961 and 1970
(Table 12). In 1952 the actual share exceeded the hypothetical in
8, in 1961 in 9 and in 1970 in 10 of the 15 industrial branches.
Metals, machinery, and transport equipment accounted for the
increase in 1961,while the additional branch in 1970 was the
chemical industry. The industry branches in which the actual share
is less than the hypothetical are in the main consumer industries.
This may also be a reflection of Yugoslavia's earlier Soviet-
type economy.
3. The "Sources" of Industrial Growth
Industrial production in 1970 exceeded the 1952 level by a factor
greater than six. For three industrial branches, petroleum,
chemicals and electrical machinery and supplies, the growth factor
exceeded ten (Table A-3). It would be useful to know what provided
the stimulous for this growth, e.g., import substitution, export
expansion or domestic demand. The purpose of this section is to
separate the "source" of industrial growth into these three
categories*, This exercise will provide information for analyzing
the Yugoslav industrialization strategy with respect to its being- 36 -
"inward" or "outward" oriented.
H. Chenery developed an identity from which the "sources" of
growth can be derived. This identity is
x! x! /x
2 x!\






l l \ l 1/
where
X. = gross output of industry i
M. = imports of i
Z. = X. + M. - total available supply
D. = domestic intermediate and final demand
E. - exports of i
1,2 = time periods
Now, by dividing the above equation by AX., the "sources" of
industrial growth can be estimated; the first term on the right
of the equality sign is the growth attributable to domestic
demand expansion, the second term is growth arising from
export expansion, and the last term represents import
substitution (IS).
The methodology used here to identify the sources of growth owes
its origin to the work of Hollis B. Chenery, ("Patterns of
Industrial Growth", American Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 34
(September 1960), pp. 324-354), and the modifications of Samuel
A. Morley and Gordon W. Smith, ("On the Measurement of Import
Substitution," American Economic Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (September
1970), pp. 728-735), and William Tyler, ("Methodological Notes
on Analyzing the Manufactured Performance in Less Developed
Countries'," Kiel Discussion Papers, No. 28, Kiel Institute of
World Economics, February 1973).- Table 12


















































































































































































Source: Actual values computed from data in Statisticki Godisnjak SFRY and Industrijska Preduzeca.
Normal values computed from equations in G. Fels, K.N. Schatz and F. Wolter, Der Zusammenhang
zwischen Produktionsstruktur und Entwicklunghiveau, versuch einer Strukturprognose fur die
westdeutsche Virtschaft, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd. CVI, 1971 I, pp. 249 sqq.- 38
This measure of import substitution is likely to underestimate
actual import substitution because of intermediate effects not
taken into account. This downward bias would be especially
likely for a country like Yugoslavia, whose industrial sector
has a relatively high degree of interdependence. To avoid this













Z* = X. + M*
1 li
with the c..*s being elements of the Leontief inverse matrix,





a vector of redefined imports. The interpretation of M is that
it is a measure of the domestic production required to com-
pletely substitute for imports, assuming final demands remain
constant.- 39
Similarly, intermediate effects can be taken into account in
measuring the contribution of exports to economic growth. Using the
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which is a measure of the total production attributed to exports.
Using the concepts of redefined exports and imports, we formulate
the following identity%
1 1 i• 1 2
x: x: ; M! MT
AX. = -~x AD. + -rfc A E
X + ! ~x - -~x
z:
 L z!
 x \z! z: zi
Again* the proportion of growthrattributable to each of the three
"sources" can be obtained by dividing through by A X.*;
The term for domestic demand can be considered as a residual and is
found by subtracting the sum of IS and EE from 100 (percent).
Note also that the proportion of growth attributed to import sub-
stitution and export expansion is underestimated because the
method of calculation does not take account of secondary income
effects (see Tyler, op. cit.). One should also bear in mind that
IS is an ex post concept. It is a definitional measure of import
substitution and as such does not necessarily convey implications
with respect to an economic policy of import substitution. That is,
import substitution as measured here may occur without an orientation
of policy in that direction. Additionally, the base years in the
measurement have a crucial importance. For example, one would
expect, ceteris paribus, that IS
X would be less if the end-period
(beginning-period) year is one of economic buoancy (slump), and
the more rapid the expansion and the closer to full employment the
economy is, the less will be IS .- 40 -
The sources of growth were calculated using both constant and
current prices. Because Yugoslav prices have been subject to
considerable government control and change by decree the use of
constant prices is preferred. However it was not possible to
obtain data in constant prices for the 20 branches of the
Yugoslav industrial sector. The analysis in this section is
limited to the 11 branches for which it was possible to calculate
exports in constant prices (Table 13) . To obtain export and import
values in constant prices of 1966, current dinar values were
arrived at by using the 1966 exchange rate of 12.5 new dinars =
$ 1 (U.S.) and were then deflated by the export or import price
index (1966 = 100) for the appropriate branch of industry.
Production by industry branch in 1966 prices was calculated by
using the 1966 input-output table and indices of production.
Constant-price calculations of the sources of growth for
2
various periods are shown in Table 13. The sources of growth
computed from current price data have been included in the
appendix. Because these results are generally in line with the
analysis in this section based on constant prices it was not
felt necessary to analyze them here.
Constant price data are however not to be considered as being
free of imperfections either.
2
The eleven industry branches for which we have data in constant
prices accounted for about three-fourths of the value added in
1966 of the industrial sector less electric power and coal and
coke.- 41 -
Looking at the results in Table 13 on a four-period basis
(1952-1956, 1956-1961, 1961-1965, 1965-1970) first, import
substitution appears to have been an important source of industrial
growth in the first and third periods, while being negative in
the second and last periods. The increase in the role of
import substitution in period three may be a result of the
introduction of a tariff system as part of the economic reforms
of 1961. The average tariff rate rose by about 24 percent between
1962 and 1964 (from 18.8 % to 23.3 %) and was accompanied by
increasing import restrictions. The last period includes the
reform of 1965, which was to push open the doors of the economy
considerably wider. And the data support the conclusion that
progress was indeed made. No dout?t helped along by a reduction in
the average tariff rate on industrial goods from 26.4 percent in
1964 to 15 percent in 1969 (13.1 % in 1971), import substitution
2 • . • became significantly negative. Meanwhile the role of export
A negative value for import substitution implies that imports
(direct plus indirect) have grown faster than total supply
(imports plus domestic production), i.e., the ratio of imports
to total supply was greater at the end of the period than at the
beginning. The results for period three provide indication that
import substitution and export expansion are hot necessarily
conflicting sources of growth.
2 ••••••
The strange values in Table 13 for the coal industry seem to be
connected with a decline in real output from 1965 to 1970. While
export expansion in value terms was positive, the negative output
expansion produced a negative value for the share of export ex-
pansion in output growth.Table 13
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Source: Yugoslav Input-Output Table, 1966; Statisticki Godis'njak SFRY; Statistika Spoljne Trgovine. See text for method of computation.- 43 -
expansion in the growth process fell somewhat as export promotion
activities were reduced, but still remained at a substantial
21,2 percent.
Dividing the 1952-1970 period into two sub-periods coinciding with
the previously defined inaugural and reform stages yields a
picture that implies Yugoslavia made substantial progress in
opening the economy. Viewed from this light, import substitution
has occupied a minor role in the growth of industry. And the
period of reform has seen a mounting importance of export
expansion. The import substitution that occurred in 1961-1970 was
2 confined to non-consumer goods industries. Metal products and
electrical machinery were the two highest tariff-protected
industries in the industrial sector in 1969, the rates being
25.1 and 21.7 percent respectively; no other industry was pro-
tected by a tariff greater than 13.1 percent.
4. Linkages in the Yugoslav Economy
An important characteristic of an industry is the interdependence
between it and other industries. The capacity of an industry to
stimulate production increases in supplier and user industries should
receive consideration (but should not result in the factor pro-
The current price data yield results that imply considerably less,
although still positive, progress was made in this direction.
2
Does not hold true in the case of current price data.- 44 -
portions of the production process being ignored) in the formation
of development policy. The greater the backward and forward
linkages of a sector, the greater ceteris paribus, will be its
contribution to the growth process. In an effort to shed further
light on the industrialization process in Yugoslavia, we have
computed the forward and backward linkages for 29 economic sectors.
Estimates of the linkages were made using the Leontief inverse
matrix, [ I-A ' J , calculated from the 1962 input-output table.
Each of the elements c. in the matrix indicates the gross output
of sector i required to produce one unit of sector j. Each column
sum, I c.., represents the gross output from all sectors necessary
to produce one unit of product j. Similarly, each row sum, E c..,
denotes the output of sector i needed for the production of one
unit of each of the j sectors. A measure of the backward linkages
of sector i is its column sum and the forward linkages are indicated
by its row sum. Following Rasmussen, one can then compute an
index of forward arid backward linkages. The index relates the
linkages of a given sector to what is essentially a national
average. The computation of the index takes the following forms
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P.N. Rasmussen, Studies in Inter-Sectoral Relations (Amsterdam;
Worth Holland Publishing.Co., 1956), pp. 133-135. Note also that,
as implied by the |_I-A J matrix, the output figures associated with
the c. elements are domestic requirements.- 45 -
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where n refers to the number of sectors in the input-output table. The
greater the value of B. and F. the greater the stimulus to output in
other sectors eminating from a given sector. The indexes together
with a sectoral ranking are presented in Table 14,
Spearman rank correlation tests were performed in order to determine
if there is an association between the linkage characteristics of
industries and certain industrialization variables. The results of
these tests, which are contained in Table 15, show the association
to be extremely weak. The correlation coefficient between the share
of industrial investment (1952-1961) and forward and total
linkages is significant at the .01 level, indicating that government
policy (the investment decision was a Federal one during this period)
had the effect of channelling higher shares of industrial invest-
ment towards those industries with the greatest forward and total
linkages. In this way output and employment in industries involved
in production at a "higher" stage were stimulated. The rank corre-
lation between export expansion as a source of growth (computed from
current price data) and total linkages is significant at the .10
level; all of the other correlation coefficients were found to be not
significant at this level of significance. In addition to the
coefficients being not significant, several have the "wrong" sign,
for example, the association between import substitution measured
in constant prices and linkages turned out to be not only weak
but negative. It would appear that Yugoslav industrialization
policy, from an ex post standpoint at least, and based upon the data
in Table 15, did not attach great importance to the linkage charac-
teristics of the various industrial branches.- 46 -
Table 14








































































































































































































Source; computed from data in the Yugoslav Input-Output Table, 1962.-- 47 j-
Table 15
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
LINKAGES AND SELECTED GROWTH VARIABLES








Annual Average Export Growth
(1952-1961)

























11 sectors, numbers in parentheses are results when current




significant at .01 level















others not significant at this level
Source: Computed from data in Tables 13 and 14 and in Statisticki Godi^njak
SFRJ and Statistika Spoljne Trgovine. '- 43 -
5. Factor Intensities of Yugoslav Foreign Trade
Yugoslav exports totalled $ 2237 million in 1972, while imports
came to $ 323 3 million. The '.foreign trade turnover (exports plus imports)
was equal to 40 percent of the social product (about 33 percent
of the GDP at market prices). Exports and imports were equal to
about $ 107 and # 156 per capita respectively. Foreign trade is
thus seen to be an important part of the Yugoslav economy. Exports
per capita and the export-GDP, import-GDP and foreign trade turnover-
GDP ratios for 1969 were calculated for Yugoslavia and nine other
countries that are similar to Yugoslavia in area or per capita
GDP (Table 16). In comparison with this small sample of countries,
the Yugoslav ratios and exports per capita are relatively high.
This is another indication of the important role that foreign trade
plays in the Yugoslav economy.
In this section an attempt will be made to provide some information
on the efficiency of Yugoslav foreign trade, that is, the extent
to which the foreign trade structure reflects the country's com-
parative advantages. This will be done by examining the factor
content of exports and imports. The familiar Heckscher-Ohlin model
with its usual assumptions is used. Addionally, the assumption
is made that capital is Yugoslavia's relatively scarce factor of
production and labor the relatively abundant one. The number of
Yugoslav emigrant workers, about 900,000 (about one-fifth of the
total paid domestic employment) lends some support to the proposition
However interest rates in Yugoslavia have been kept artificially low.that Yugoslavia is a relatively labor-abundant country.
Output, export and import data for 1968 were taken from the
29-sector input-output table for 1963. Fixed assets and employment
of the various sectors for 1968 were obtained from the Statistical
v' y
Yearbook (Statisticki Godisnjak) for 197C and from Yugoslav Survey
of Hay 1970. From these data the direct capital- and labor-output
ratios were calculated. Each of these two vectors (of capital- and
labor-output ratios) was then multiplied by the inverse matrix
(I-A) described previously to produce the total (direct plus
indirect) capital- and labor-output ratios for the various sectors
of the economy. The next step was to multiply these ratios by the
exports of each respective sector to determine the total capital
and labor embodied in Yugoslav exports of each sector (Table A-5).
By summing these factor requirements for the various industrial
sectors one arrives at the total factor requirements for Yugoslav
industrial exports. Repeating the last two steps t/ith respect to imports
produces the total capital and labor required to produce domestically
Yugoslavia's industrial imports.
The ratios of capital to labor embodied, in various groups of exports
and imports are presented in Table 17. Looking at the bottom two
rows of the table we find that the relative capital-intensity of
total exports exceeds that of total imports. For a relatively
capital-scarce country this is not what one would expect. iJowever
included in total trade are non-competitive imports, i.e., imports
of goods whose domestic elasticity of supoly is extremely lows e.n.9
An implicit assumption here is that all the industrial branches in
the input-output table are import-competing.- 50 -
TABLE 16









































































































Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1969, Table 2; U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts
Statistics. 1973; Vol. Ill, Table I-A; U.N. Handbook of International Trade
and Development Statistics, 1972, Table 1.1 and 6.1; OECD, Economic Survey
of Yugoslavia, 1973, Tables B and J.- 51 -
coffee, tea and cocoa, and commodities whose production location
is tied to an input source, i.e., supply-oriented industries such
as mineral production. For our purposes it is more meaningful to
look at certain sub-categories of exports and imports. The first
two rows of Table 17 relate to trade in sectors 4-21 of Table A-5,
i.e. industrial sector (Yugoslav definition) goods minus electrical
energy, coal and crude petroleum production and processing. Here
we find the "right" relationship between the export and import
capital-labor ratios; the capital intensity of imports is 9.6 per-
cent greater than of exports.
In addition, the factor requirements of two other export and import
groups have been calculated. First, industrial sector exports and
imports were reduced by attempting to exclude goods for which the
nation's natural endowment is a major determinant of comparative
advantage as opposed to capital and labor, i.e., domestic (non-
capital and -labor) resource-related industries. After this process
of elimination the remaining industries consist of ferrous metallurgy,
metal products, shipbuilding, electrical machinery, chemicals,
textiles, and leather and footwear. This time the capital intensity of
imports is greater than of exports by a very substantial 28.4 percent.
The most exclusive group of commodities includes six newly-created
industries (petroleum* ferrous metallurgy, metal products, ship-
building, electrical machinery and chemicals). These industries were
established mainly during the period of the first post-war plan and
were favored by the export coefficient and subsidy system that




The domestic resource and newly created industry classification used
here is patterned after a similar grouping by Pertot, op. cit.,
Vol. I, pp. 77 ff. The newly-created industries accounted for 8.8
percent of industrial exports in 1952 and 41.2 percent in 1968
(44.0 percent in 1965; the smaller share in 1968 may be a reflection
of the reduced level of export promotion following the economic
reform of 1965).- 52 -
TABLE 17
CAPITAL AND LABOR EMBODIED IN YUGOSLAV INDUSTRIAL
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Source: Table A-5- 53 -
relationship; the capital intensity of imports exceeds that of exports
by 3.1 percent. The capital-intensity of this latter import group
vis-a-vis the capital-intensity of exports is relatively low, imply-
ing that Yugoslavia has a greater comparative advantage in the
more traditional products such as textiles (including clothing)
and leather and footwear. This is not at all surprising. Never-
theless, based on the model used here, Yugoslav industrial trade
is consistent with the nation's labor and capital endowment.
Before ending this section on the foreign trade structure a few
comments are in order regarding the geographical structure of
Yugoslav exports. The shares of several groups of countries in
the exports of various commodity categories were calculated for
I960 and 1972 (Table 18). The lowest shares of the developing
countries tend to be in labor-intensive exports, e.g., clothing,
footwear, and leather products. This structure is consistent with
Yugoslavia's factor endowments vis-a-vis this group of countries.
Paper and motor vehicle exports, both capital-intensive, are
examples in which the developing countries receive a relatively
high proportion of the total (and the developed countries of western
Europe and the United States a relatively low proportion). The
developing countries received a relatively low, and declining
share of iron and steel exports, a capital-intensive good. An
explanation for this may be the attraction that steel mills have
in the LDCs. High export shares going to the capital-abundant group
of nations consisting of the U.S., EEC and EFTA are found in the
labor-intensive furniture and textile and leather exports, as well
as in the capital-intensive non-ferrous metals. High shares of the
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eastern European nations can be found in non-ferrous
metals and in such labor-intensive exports as footwear, textiles
and clothing.
Thus the export shares of the various country-groups do not
present a clear-cut case either for or against the proposition
that the direction of exports makes sense from a factor endowment
viewpoint. Nevertheless, the directional pattern of exports does
provide some encouragement for those who believe that there is
some order in international commodity trade. The combined shares
of the U.S., EEC and EFTA in 1972 were higher than in 1960 for
all the SITC 5-8 export categories found in Table 18 except for
those in SITC sector 8. An explanation for this may be that scale
economies, increases in the quality of the labor force, and
learning factors have helped to increase the quality and price
competitiveness of Yugoslavia in these goods vis-a-vis the
2 developed countries. The shares of the developing countries in
the SITC 5-8 categories were lower in the majority of cases in
1972 than in 1960. In the machinery and transport equipment sector,
declines of these shares were accompanied mainly by increases in
the shares of the developed market economies of western Europe and
the U.S. as opposed to the eastern European nations. This would
appear to be further evidence of an increasing sophistication of
Yugoslav production.
An application of the above type of test to geographically
disaggregated exports would perhaps shed additional light on
the nature of Yugoslavia's exports to countries with different
relative factor endowments.
2
Changes in tariff levels may also have been a contributing factor- 56 -
6. Regional Inequalities
The growth of total and industrial product under the system of
workers
1 self-management in Yugoslavia has been rapid from both an
absolute standpoint and in relation to the experiences of other
nations of the world. Nevertheless, the country has been unable to
overcome a lingering depressed areas problem. Some information of
regional economic development in Yugoslavia is presented in Table
19. Although the areas officially designated as underdeveloped have
varied somewhat over time, a good approximation of these "insuffi-
ciently developed" areas, as they were termed in the 1966-1970
Five Year Plan, would include the republics of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and the autonomous province of
Kosovo. These regions currently account for about 40 percent of the
area, 35 percent of the population and 21 percent of the social product
of Yugoslavia.
The social product of the less developed regions increased from
1959 to 1970 by a factor of approximately 2, as did the social
product of the developed areas. However a more rapid rate of
population growth in the former led to a slower rate of increase of
per capita product. Per capita social product in the less developed
regions (LDRs) grew at an annual compound rate of 4.9 percent from
1959 to 1970, while in the more developed areas (MDRs) the rate of
increase was 5.8 percent. The situation then is one in which per capita
income has been increasing at a reasonably rapid rate in the less
developed regions but at the same time the income gap between the- 57 -
rich and the poor regions has been widening.
The government has maintained a goal of achieving a more equal
level of income in the various republics and autonomous provinces.
The major policy that has been used in attempting to realize this
goal has consisted of providing preferential investment treatment
to the less developed areas, i.e., these areas were given special
priority in the allocation of investment funds and in the rate of
interest paid on funds. These investments were aimed towards
bringing about a rapid and intensive industrialization of the regions
and thereby a narrowing of the income gap. The ratio of gross
fixed investment to the social product from 1953-1969 (Table 19)
was 35.0 percent in the less developed regions compared to 24.2
in the more developed. However in the mid-1960s the role of banks
and enterprises as a source of investment funds increased con-
siderably. Consequently the share of gross fixed investment in the
social product in the rich and the poor regions has moved closer
together.
The growth of industrial value added was more rapid in the LBRS
than in the MDRs in 1952-1970, the annual compound growth rates
being 11.6 and 1C.8 respectively. The LDRs' share of Yugoslav
industrial value added has increased from 18.5 to 20.7 percent.
The share of investment funds coming from enterprises and banks
was about 38 percent in 1960 and 84 percent in 1970 (Statisticki
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Source: Statistic'*.! Codisniak SFRY, 1954, 1963, 1972.
Note: ND - new dinars.- 59 -
Industrial production in Yugoslavia has become considerably more
capital-intensive (in terms of fixed assets per worker) over time.
But whereas in 1952 the fixed assets per worker in industry in the
MDRs exceeded that in the LDRs by about 12 percent, by 1970 this
relationship had been turned around and the fixed assets per
industrial worker in the LDRs was about 25 percent greater than
in the MDRs. It would appear then that either investment in the
LDRs was directed towards relatively capital-intensive industries to
a greater extent than in the MDRs or else production for given
industries was more capital intensive in the LDRs. The former
explanation explains at least part of the difference in capital
intensity; more than 52 percent of the industrial investment in
the LDRs during 1952-1969 was in the relatively capital-intensive
industries of coal mining, steel, non-ferrous metals and non-
metallic minerals as compared to only 30 percent in the ISDRs.
This pattern of investment may at least partly be attributable to
the natural resource endoxraients of the regions. It also seems likely
however that the relative labor abundance of the LDRs has not
been fully exploited. J. Plummer in a recent study estimated that
the 1962 level and composition of industrial production could have
been achieved with 81.0 percent of the actual capital used. On a
North-South regional division, industrial production in the Northern
Republics could have been achieved with an estimated 85.3 percent of
the actual capital and in the Southern republics with 78.0 of the
actual capital.
James L. Plummer, "Inter-Firm Production Function Analysis of
Yugoslav Industrial Resource Allocation", Journal of Industrial
Economics, Vol. XIX$ No. 1, November 1970, Table II.60 -
7. The Structure of Industrial Enterprises According to Size
It is well known that the size of the firm has implications
regarding economic efficiency (both static and dynamic). Thus an
examination of the size structure of a nation*s industrial sector
can provide information concerning the efficiency of industrial
production. An examination of the size structure of Yugoslav
industrial enterprises reveals that the number of enterprises has
fallen from 3,254 in 1939 to 2,374 in 1970. Although the number of
enterprises in 1970 was slightly larger than in 1953, there has
been a considerable decrease in the number and share of small
enterprises (125 or less employees) during this period. The share
of firms in this size category declined from 64.9 percent of in-
dustrial enterprises in 1953 to 39.5 in 1961 and 28.1 in 1970. The
share of industrial employment, fixed assets and social product
associated with small enterprises has also decreased. Only about
3 percent of industrial workers were employed by these small firms
in 1970. This pattern of change in the size structure of industrial
enterprises has probably been a positive factor in the industrial
growth in Yugoslavia in that it made increases in production
efficiency possible through the realization of economies of scale.
The big decrease took place soon after the end of World War II.
As seen in Table 20, the number in 1961 exceeded that in 1953; a
decline occurred from 1961 to 1970, when the number approximated
that of 1953.
2
The data in Table 20 actually understate the importance of large
enterprises. This is because it is common for Yugoslav industrial
enterprises to become members of groups of firms in which certain
firm functions are centralized.TABLE 20
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES ACCORDING TO NUMBERS EMPLOYED, 1953, 1961, 1970
Industrial Sector
Characteristic
Nuirber of Enterprises 1953
Number of Enterprises 1961
Number of Enterprises 1970
Number of Employees 1961
Number of Employees 1970
Active Fixed Assets 1961
(purchase value,m.ND)
1970
Social Product (m.ND) 1961











































































































Source: Statisticki Godisnjak SFRY, 1954, 1963, 1972.- 62 -
The rationalization in terms of size of industrial enterprises takes
on a greater scope when viewed against the situation in another
southern European semi-industrialized country, Spain. In 1968,
97.3 percent of the manufacturing firms in Spain employed 100
or fewer persons, while as stated above only 28.1 percent of Yugoslav
industrial enterprises employed 125 or fewer persons in 1970. The
3 percent of Yugoslav industrial workers employed in small firms
appears even smaller when compared with the 49.4 percent of manu-
facturing workers in Spain employed by firms employing 100 or less
persons. In the same years, 78.7 percent of Yugoslav industrial
employment was in firms employing more than 500 persons each, while
in Spain the percentage was 22.8.
The predominance of large enterprises is a unique feature of
Yugoslav industry, given the nation's stage of development. This
large firm orientation can be expected to affect efficiency in two
principal ways. The possibility of realizing griater economies of
scale would have a positive effect on efficiency. On the other hand,
larger and fewer firms imply greater monopoly power and increase
the likelihood of collusion. However the largest industrial
enterprise in Yugoslavia, the oil concern INA, has assets that are
less than 2 percent of those of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
the largest United States oil firm. The United States Steel
Corporation is fifty times as large as Yugoslavia's largest steel
2
enterprise. The feeling here is that the orientation of Yugoslav
Spain and Yugoslavia are at similar stages of development and have
experienced relatively rapid industrial expansion. The data on
Spain are taken from J.B. Donges, "From an Autarchic Towards a
Cautiously Outward-Looking Industrialization Policy: The Case of
Spain", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Band 107, Heft 1, 1971, Table 4
2
The comparisons are from Dirlam and Plummer, op. cit., p. 75.""• f>"\ —
industry towards the relatively large enterprise has been a positive
factor in industrial growth and resource efficiency. This feeling
is strengthened by Vanek's argument that the optimum size of
firm tends to be smaller and the structure of industry more
competitive in a labor-managed system than in other types of
market economies. (Yugoslav enterprises, as noted above, do not
appear so large when compared with firms in the industrialized
countries).
Jaroslav Vanek, The General Theory of Labor-managed Market
Economies, Ithaca, H.Y., Cornell University Press, 1970, p. 272.- 64 -
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides evidence that frequent and major institutional
change can go hand-in-hand with rapid economic growth.
Industrialization in Yugoslavia has taken place under conditions
of a reasonable degree of openness of the economy. Progress
continues to be made in this direction. Six devaluations of the
dinar have occurred since 1951. A limited foreign exchange market
has been established and was followed by a float of the dinar.
Foreign exchange reserves have been increasing. Twenty-three
joint ventures were established in 1972 compared to four in
1967 and 1968. Tariffs were reduced from one to twelve percent
°n abcdt 1000 items in 1972. Inflation and the trade balance
continue to be problems. Overall, however, the performance of
the economy deserves high marks. Change and experiment will no
doubt continue to be features of the Yugoslav system as it attempts
to solve its problems.- 65 -
APPENDIX
Table A-l
























































































































Source: Industrijska Preduzeca, 1968, 1970.Table A-2
SELECTED INDICATORS OF PRICE MOVEMENTS, 1952-1972
Index of Prices of Manufactured Goods
Index of Prices of Agricultural Goods
Index of Prices of Retail Prices





Ratio of Index of Prices of Manufactured Goods
to Agricultural Goods
Rate of Inflation as shown by the implicit











































































Index of Prices of Manufactured Goods
Index of Prices of Agricultural Goods
Index of Prices of Retail Prices





Ratio of Index of Prices of Manufactured Goods
to Agricultural Goods
Rate of Inflation as shown by the implicit
social product deflator (percent)


















































































Sources: Statistic^ Godisnjak SFRJ. 1971, 1973; Jugoslavia, 1945-1964.Table A - 3












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Tnrtustriju 1971. Ueograd, 1972.TAHLK A - 4
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Weighted average (gross output weights)
Source: YviToslav Input-Outnut Table. 1962, 1966; 5t.*>t Is t i cV'.i Clad i«n"Tik SFr<Y; Statistlcki Stiolzne Tovovir.e.
-XChbritre rates used to obtain direct export and import values: 7-50 dinars per U3 dollar for 1952-1956, 1956—1961 , 1952-1961 (1962 input-output
table used ir. these periods); 12.50 dinars for the remaining periods (1966 input-output table used in these periods). See' text for method
of calculation.- 69 -
TABLE A- 5
TOTAL CAPITAL AND LABOR REQUIREMENTS OF YUGOSLAV EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1968
Electricity
Coal-Production and Processing
Crude Petroleum and Processing
Ferrous Metallurgy
Non-ferrous Metallurgy
Non-Metals - Production and Processing
Metal Products
Shipbuilding

























































































































































Source: Statisticki Codisnjak SFRY, 1970; Yugoslav Input-Output Table, 1968; Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 1970;
sector 29 inputs estimated.- 70 -
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